Policy problems on the cards

Comments by ex-MI5 chief Stella Rimington have further embarrassed the government about ID cards. If the cards are unlikely to prevent terrorism, what on earth are they for?

Speaking at the Association of Colleges annual conference in Birmingham, Rimington said: 'My angle on ID cards is that they may be of some use but only if they can be made unforgeable - and all our other documentation is quite easy to forge. If we have ID cards at vast expense and people can go into a back room and forge them they are going to be absolutely useless.'

This is hardly news, but the reiteration of this point by a former senior intelligence figure only reinforces it. Even home secretary Charles Clarke was forced to admit after the London bombings that ID cards would not have prevented the attacks. Nonetheless, the government has used the implication that the cards would be of some use in the war on terror as a means of countering opposition to the loss of freedom, and enormous expense, involved in implementing the scheme. Even the other potential uses of the cards - to prevent 'identity theft', benefit fraud and other kinds of crime - are open to question.

If you create a 'gold standard' of identification that is still forgeable, then it is possible that crime could ultimately be made easier, since there are likely to be fewer questions asked if you can show an ID card. That won't stop the scheme, though. As one justification falters, another appears in its place. This is a policy, and a government, looking for a purpose.

Ex-MI5 chief sparks ID card row, BBC News, 17 November 2005